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Abstract
Latin-American countries are characterised by societal problems like violence, crime, cor-
ruption, the informality that influence any entrepreneurial activity developed by individu-
als/organisations. Social innovations literature confront “wicked problems” with strong 
interdependencies among different systems/actors. Yet, little is known about how firms 
use innovation to hedge against economic, political or societal uncertainties (i.e., violence, 
social movements, democratisation, pandemic). By translating social innovation and insti-
tutional theory approaches, this study analyses the influence of formal institutions (govern-
ment programs and actions) and informal institutions (corruption, extortion and informal 
trade) on the development/implementation of enterprises’ technological initiatives for pro-
tecting/preventing of victimisation. By using data from 5525 establishments interviewed 
in the 2012/2014 National Victimisation Survey of the Mexican National Institute of Sta-
tistics and Geography (INEGI), our findings shows that formal conditions (government 
programs) and informal conditions (corruption, extortion and informal trade) are associ-
ated with an increment in the number of enterprises’ social innovations. Our findings also 
contribute to the debate about institutional conditions, social innovations, and the role of 
ecosystems’ actors in developing economies. A provoking discussion and implications for 
researchers, managers and policymakers emerge from this study.
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1 Introduction
The accumulation of knowledge related to innovation and technology transfer literature 
has been focused on the effectiveness of policies that promotes entrepreneurial innova-
tions (Meissner et al. 2017; Guerrero and Urbano 2019), as well as the influence of these 
policies on the enterprises’ strategies for capturing innovation performance (Scuotto et al. 
2017; Guerrero et  al. 2019; Link and Scott 2019). However, little is known about how 
firms use innovation to hedge against economic uncertainties (Demircioglu and Audretsch 
2018; Goel and Nelson 2020), or the current political/societal uncertainties (i.e., violence, 
social movements, democratisation, pandemic). Inspired by this research gap, this research 
explores the links between institutional conditions and enterprises’ (technological) actions 
to respond to societal uncertainties that are affecting their business activities/performance 
(i.e., violent events and crime).
The difference related to social entrepreneurship1 is that social innovations refer to the 
process of developing/implementing novel solutions to social problems by individuals 
or organisations. The assumption is that social innovations entail an institutional change 
to confront “wicked problems” (Rittel and Webber 1973) with strong interdependen-
cies among multiple systems/actors (Rayner 2006). An ongoing academic debate is how 
“wicked problems” (i.e., violence, crime, extortion, corruption, informality and social 
mobilisations) are affecting any entrepreneurial and innovative activity developed by indi-
viduals/organisations in emerging economies (Hoskisson et al. 2000; Lee et al. 2015; Sub-
ramaniam et  al. 2015). The recognition of societal problems provides threats/opportuni-
ties for new/established entrepreneurs (Howard-Grenville et  al. 2014). For this reason, it 
is relevant to understand how individuals/organisations develop/implement alternatives to 
reduce/prevent the effect of socio-economic problematics on their entrepreneurial activities 
(Greenwood et al. 2011; Schweitzer et al. 2015).
Extant literature on institutional research has played a significant role in the understand-
ing of social innovations (Battilana and Dorado 2010; Lawrence et al. 2002; Zietsma and 
Lawrence 2010). Similarly, entrepreneurship literature has also recognised the growing 
importance in the analysis of emerging/developing economies, the relevance of under-
standing the strengths/weaknesses of institutions, and an increasing necessity to explore 
these issues with robust theoretical approaches such as institutional theory (Wright et al. 
2005). According to Messner et  al. (2013), institutions influence how social life is reg-
ulated and facilitate the functioning of social systems. Therefore, to the study, the influ-
ence of societal problems (as crime) demands a better understanding of the institutional 
structure, the institutional regulation, and the institutional performance. In this perspective, 
institutions—those who establish the “rules of the game”—significantly shape organisa-
tional strategies and individual decisions (North 1990; Peng 2001, 2003).
Each society has multiple groups with different opinions explained by constraining 
norms, values, and beliefs (Webb et  al. 2009, p. 3). Because of these differences, a gap 
often exists between what certain groups understand to be legal (specified by laws and reg-
ulations) and what they consider to be legitimate (specified by norms, values, and beliefs) 
(Baumol 1990; Dowling and Pfeffer 1975; Scott 1995; Weber 1978). This gap is more rel-
evant in developing economies by the variance between what is legal in those societies 
1 Social entrepreneurship is focused on individuals/organisations who create innovative initiatives, build 
new social arrangements, and mobilize resources in response to collective social problems rather than mar-
ket criteria (Alvord et al. 2004).
Institutional conditions and social innovations in emerging…
1 3
and what some groups consider to be legitimate in those societies allows for certain dark 
conditions to emerge (Webb et al. 2009). Translating this reasoning into social innovation 
and adopting North’s ideas (1990), enterprises’ social innovations may be configured by 
the quality of formal institutions (regulations, programs) and the quality of informal insti-
tutions (values, attitudes). If these conditions are not optimal, individuals or organisations 
assume that they are competent interpreters of their own lives and competent solvers of 
their problems (Griffin and Prakash 2014). As a result, they develop/implement effective 
methods for cultivating social innovation as a mechanism of prevention or protection of 
violent events in developing economies.
This study analyses the influence of formal institutions (government programs and 
actions) and informal institutions (corruption, extortion and informal trade) on the devel-
opment/implementation of enterprises’ technological initiatives for protecting/preventing 
of victimisation. By adopting the institutional approach (North 1990; Scott 1995; Weber 
1978), we proposed a conceptual framework tested in a Latin-American country—Mex-
ico-. Why? Because this country has implemented several public initiatives for transiting 
into the innovative-driven economy but with a retard related to social issues. This scenario 
is adequate for analysing how the lack of quality of institutions generate negative externali-
ties for individuals and organisations. By using data from 5525 establishments interviewed 
in the 2012/2014 National Victimisation Survey of the Mexican National Institute of Statis-
tics and Geography (INEGI), our findings shows that formal conditions (government pro-
grams) and informal conditions (corruption, extortion and informal trade) are associated 
with an increment in the number of enterprises’ social innovations. A provoking discussion 
and implications for researchers, managers and policymakers emerge from this study.
After this introduction, this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the litera-
ture review and our proposed conceptual model. Section 3 describes the methodological 
design. Section 4 outlines the results and discussion. Finally, Sect. 5 summarises the con-
cluding remarks, limitations, implications, and avenues for further research.
2  Theoretical framework
2.1  Formal conditions and enterprises’ social innovations
Government intervention aligns quality of life (economic, political, and cultural) and 
social behaviours (i.e., criminal activity). In emerging economies, government intervention 
implies the combination of programs to foster economic growth and programs to reduce 
criminal and violent events. On the economic point of view, government intervention is 
oriented toward attracting private capital (Coleman et al. 2005). However, criminal/violent 
events represent many costs for developing economies (Edwards 2001). On the violence/
crime perspective, government intervention requires an understanding of violent/criminal 
event and the available resources (Coleman 2003; Byrne and Marx 2011). If the quality of 
institutions is not right, governmental programs will be predominantly reactive since their 
implementation until their effectiveness (Bunker 2013). The timing and socioeconomic 
conditions will produce a negative effect on enterprises’ operations/performance (Okereke 
et  al. 2012). Given the reactive and retarded governmental intervention, enterprises will 
implement strategies to protect theirs operations and employees from adverse societal con-
ditions (Mair and Marti 2009; Marti et al. 2013; Van Wijk et al. 2015). By assuming the 
lack of institutional quality, we propose the following hypotheses:
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H1 The existence of reactive governmental programs increase the number of social inno-
vations developed by enterprises to address societal problematics.
H1a The effect of reactive governmental programs on the number of social innovations 
will be positively reinforced when enterprises have been victimised.
A pro-active government intervention requires a fundamental change in individuals’ atti-
tudes/willingness to reduce the vulnerabilities generated by criminal or violent individuals/
organisations (Vaccaro and Palazzo 2015; Williams and Godson 2002). Previous studies 
provide little insights into the effectiveness of anti-crime actions/strategies on the reduction 
of criminal/violent events. In the 1990s, U.S. federal resources were allocated into police 
departments to implement initiatives (i.e., an increment in the number of police or the use 
of technology) without any results (Levitt 2004). Aggressive tacit strategies (i.e., aggres-
sive panhandling, community policing rather than merely responding to emergency calls) 
were implemented in large cities to prevent criminal events (Corman and Mocan 2002). 
As a result, New York and Boston evidenced a reduction of violence (Levitt 2004). We 
assume that the implementation of proactive government interventions will be challenging 
when the lack of quality of institutions is persisting (Coleman et al. 2005). Consequently, 
the effects produced by proactive initiatives will be few. In this assumption, enterprises 
will development/implement social innovations as protection or prevention mechanism of 
adverse events. Based on these arguments, we propose the following hypotheses:
H2 The existence of reactive governmental actions reduce the number of social innova-
tions developed by enterprises to address societal problematics.
H2a The effect of reactive governmental actions on the number of social innovations will 
be positively reinforced when enterprises have been victimised.
2.2  Informal conditions and enterprises’ social innovations
According to Aidis (2005), corruption is one of the most relevant informal barriers to 
developing any entrepreneurial initiative. Previous studies found that countries with 
lower entry barriers and less corruption are associated with the highest level of entre-
preneurial initiatives (Klapper et al. 2010). However, recent studies also found that cor-
ruption can be beneficial for those individuals/organisations involved in entrepreneurial 
activities with well-established networks and sufficient financial resources (Méon and 
Sekkat 2005). Therefore, corruption plays a dual role, serving as both grease and sand 
for entrepreneurship (Chowdhury et  al. 2015). In this regard, Rodriguez et  al. (2005) 
explain that substantial literature reveals two dimensions of corruption across countries: 
(1) the pervasive that reveals the average firm’s likelihood of encountering corruption 
in its regular interactions with state officials; and (2) the arbitrary that results from the 
ability and willingness of corrupt officials to vary the set of necessary approvals to 
extract maximum bribes or from the entry of bureaucrats into the market for extortion. 
In both cases, the principals (authorities or third persons) are interested in maximising 
their return, while the agents (individuals/organisations) might be motivated by their 
interests and strategies (Wu 2005). We assume that enterprises need to explore diverse 
alternatives to address societal problematics. Therefore, managers/owners who accept to 
participate in the act of corruption motivated by an authority (police, public persecutor) 
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does not guaranty the reduction of criminal events (De Bakker et  al. 2005; Egri and 
Ralston 2008; Griffin and Prakash 2014). Based on these arguments, we propose the fol-
lowing hypotheses:
H3 Corruption increases the number of social innovations developed by enterprises to 
address societal problematics.
H3a The effect of corruption on the number of social innovations will be positively rein-
forced when enterprises have been victimised.
Previous studies suggest that extortion is a significant hindrance for establishments 
in developing economies (Mehlum et  al. 2002; Morselli and Giguere 2006; Ranasinghe 
2012). According to Ranasinghe (2012), extortion is an essential channel for understand-
ing resource misallocation. In this vein, criminal organisation approaches potential victims 
(entrepreneurs) and demands a payment (extortion, tribute/fees), where failure to com-
ply can result in physical harm or damage to property (Morselli and Giguere 2006). The 
dimension of extortions will depend on the victims’ ability to pay the fee. A higher violent 
capacity increases both the supply and the demand for protection, as well as increasing 
both the price of protection and the incomes of violent groups (Mehlum et al. 2002). In the 
market-based extortion, we assume that a rise in violent capacity creates a higher demand/
price for protection. Therefore, disorder and violence increase the willingness to pay for 
protection and increase the rents to be collected by criminal organisations. Victimised 
enterprises will be more likely to implement technological strategies as a mechanism of 
protection (Levitt 2004). Based on these arguments, we propose the following hypotheses:
H4 The extortion increases the number of social innovations developed by enterprises to 
address societal problematics.
H4a The effect of extortion on the number of social innovations will be positively rein-
forced when enterprises have been victimised.
A broader shadow economy is related to less tax revenue and less investment in pub-
lic infrastructure (Loayza 1996). According to Nichter and Goldmark (2009, p. 1455), 
informal trade is related to unregistered enterprises with income from both legal and 
illegal goods/services. Bruton et al. (2012) consider that informal trade includes organi-
sations of any size (not just small ones) that decide to do not to register. Therefore, in an 
informal economy, the exploration/exploitation of opportunities occur outside of formal 
institutional boundaries but within informal institutional boundaries (Webb et al. 2009; 
Zimmerman and Zeitz 2002). Under these conditions, enterprises face informal compet-
itors with more competitive advantages (i.e., in terms of costs). These conditions hurt 
entrepreneurial activities with an intensified effect when enterprises have been victim-
ised by organised crime (Gould Ellen and O’Regan 2008). We assume that enterprises 
are more likely to implement social innovations that allow them to protect their daily 
activities and prevent the effect on the performance of violent events. Based on these 
arguments, we propose the following hypotheses:
H5 Informal trade increases the number of social innovations developed by enterprises to 
address societal problematics.
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H5a The effect of informal trade on the number of social innovations will be positively 
reinforced when enterprises have been victimised.
2.3  Proposed conceptual framework
Figure 1 shows the proposed conceptual framework to understand the influence of formal 
institutions and informal institutions on the development/implementation of enterprises’ 
technological initiatives for protecting/preventing of victimisation. By adopting the insti-
tutional approach (North 1990; Scott 1995; Weber 1978), we argue the effect of specific 
formal (government programs and government actions) and informal (corruption, extortion 
and informal trade) institutional environmental conditions. Given the highest rate of vic-
timisation in emerging economies, we included as a moderation the effect generated when 
the enterprise has faced an offence from violent/criminal organisations (Levitt 2004).
3  Methodology
3.1  Research setting
Officially called the United Mexican States, Mexico is a federal republic comprising of 32 
states with a total population of more than 122 million. Politically, Mexico faced a process 
of political transition from a one-party system that had dominated for 70 years under the 
Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) to a multiparty system in 2000 (Bunker 2013). 
Mexico had two Partido Acción Nacional (PAN) administrations, under Fox (2000–2006) 
and Calderón (2007–2012). A return of the PRI during the Peña Nieto administration 
(2013–2018). In the last election, a new democratic party with the Lopez Obrador admin-
istration (2018–2023). Economically, Mexico has been classified as an efficiency-driven 
(Porter and Schwab 2008, p. 9). It means that the country’s main advantage comes from 
producing more advanced products and services highly efficiently. However, the main 
challenges have been the lack of capacity to produce innovative products/services using 
the most advanced methods (Solleiro and Castañón 2005). The GDP has shown a higher 
Formal
FF: Government programs (inversion, anti-
crime, etc.)
FF: Government strategies/actuations 
(patrols, street operations, etc.)
Informal
IF: Corruption (authorities)  
IF: Extortion (third persons)
IF: Informal trade 
Institutional 
Determinants  
Social 
innovations 
(technological & 
traditional) 
Moderation: 
(Victimised)  
Enterprises’
actions
H1
H2
H1a
H2a
H3
H4
H3a
H4a
H5a
H5 
Fig. 1  Institutional determinants of enterprises’ social innovations Source: Authors
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growth rate in comparison with other Latin-American emerging economies. Regarding the 
openness to international trade, Mexico has celebrated more than 40 free trade agreements 
with different countries around the world (Mexican Government 2013, p. 23). Socially, the 
growing criminal organisations increased the violence/crime levels within Mexico (Kan 
2011). However, the levels of violence in Mexico have been lower than Honduras, Ven-
ezuela, Belize, Salvador, Guatemala, Colombia, Brazil and Dominican Republic (Heinle 
et  al. 2015, p. 2). Several weaknesses continue affecting the country in terms of a rigid 
labour market, a weak educational system, an inequitable income distribution, social ten-
sions, rampant crime, low levels of trust in politicians, and a sense of rigid reforms (Haus-
mann et al. 2009).
Social, economic and democratic contrasts are aligned with two relevant trends. Firstly, 
adequate institutions reinforce that creative individuals/organisations would be more likely 
to create wealth via entrepreneurial activities (Sobel 2008). However, inadequate institu-
tions produce that creative individuals/organisations would be involved in unproductive 
activities such as crime or specific negative behaviour (Rosenthal and Ross 2010). Sec-
ondly, in scenarios where national strategies abound to support economic growth and no 
comparable strategies at the national level exist to support social innovation, individuals/
organisations are motivated by the lack of quality of the institutions to develop innovative 
actions to solve the socio-economic problems that they faced (Mulgan 2006). Based on 
these arguments, this study analyses in-depth the institutional determinants of social inno-
vations developed by Mexican enterprises.
3.2  Sample and data collection
The dataset used contains establishment-level2 data from the 2012 and the 2014 National 
Victimisation Survey.3 This database was collected by the Mexican National Institute of 
Statistics and Geography (INEGI). The sample was characterised as probabilistic and 
stratified as the results of the survey were widespread, including the entire study popula-
tion, and possible measuring errors of estimates were also obtained (INEGI 2012). The 
survey yielded national estimates for the 32 Mexican states. In total, 51,804 establishments 
answered the 2012 (23,635) and 2014 (28,179) survey. Given the nature of our study, this 
sample suffered some reductions by the missing values in our main dependent variables. 
More concretely, only 10% of the establishments reported information about practices/
costs associated with the social innovations implemented to address the societal problems. 
Our final sample includes 5525 establishments.
2 Establishment is defined as the collection of economic units that perform some economic activity in the 
country captured in the Economic Census, except for the activities related to agriculture and the public sec-
tor and government. These economic units are a single physical location, nestled in a place permanent and 
enclosed by buildings and facilities so fixed that it combines actions and resources under the control of a 
single owner entity or controller, mainly for processing activities, assembly, etc.
3 It was a common practice implemented in countries such as the United States to monitor the crime rates 
by a national representative survey across the population (Levitt 2004). In the case of Mexico, the 2012 
survey captures the last year of the Felipe Calderón administration, and the 2014 survey captures the second 
year of the Peña Nieto administration.
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3.3  Description of variables
Based on previous empirical studies (Audretsch and Feldman 1996; Levitt 2004; Mauro 
1998), we used three dependent variables to capture our proxy of social innovations. The 
sum_socialinn that is measured by the total number of innovations developed by the enter-
prises to address the societal problems. The sum_socialinntech that represents the number 
of technology social innovations (i.e., Global Positioning System -GPS-, protection sys-
tems cyberattacks, and creation of a security area/department), and the variable sum_socia-
linntrad that represents the number of traditional social innovations (i.e., change of locks/
doors, build gates and fences, change the location, and insurance). The InCost_socialinn 
measured by the natural logarithm of the total investment on social innovations expressed 
in Mexican Pesos.
The explanatory variables were associated with institutional environmental conditions. 
Using dichotomous variables, we built some proxies to explore both formal and informal 
conditions (see Table 1). First, formal factors were measured by the programs as well as the 
actions implemented by the government. Concerning government programs, we used three 
formal binary conditions that take value 1 when the interviewed have perceived the exist-
ence of (1) programs oriented toward attracting inversion; (2) programs oriented toward 
sensitisation; and (3) programs oriented toward anti-crime activities (Coleman et al. 2005; 
Smallbone and Welter 2006; Welter and Smallbone 2011). Regarding the actions imple-
mented by the government, we used several binary variables to capture the existence of 
government strategies such as more patrols, video surveillance, maintenance, street light-
ing, and street operations (Levitt 2004). Second, informal factors were explored by cor-
ruption, extortion, and business informality measured by binary variables that take value 1 
when the interviewed have manifested those practices and 0 otherwise. Regarding corrup-
tion, we used several modalities of corruption associated to public authorities such as the 
police, public prosecutor, and Army (Duyne 1996; Chowdhury et al. 2015; Méon and Sek-
kat 2005; Peng 2001, 2003). Regarding extortion, these conditions were based on extortion 
or the tribute or fee required by third persons (Morselli and Giguere 2006; Ranasinghe 
2012; Ruggiero2010). Concerning informal trade, we used a binary variable that captures 
if the enterprises recognised informal trade in their regions (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; 
Webb et al. 2009). The moderator was associated with a dummy that captures if the estab-
lishment has or have not been victimised (Levitt 2004).
This study controlled specific structural characteristics of the establishment level 
(INEGI 2012). The enterprises’ size was measured with categorical variables based on the 
number of employees (0–10 employees, 11–50 employees, 51–250 employees, and more 
than 250 employees). We used the group of more than 250 employees as a reference given 
their characteristics and resource availability to develop these strategies (Parker 2011). The 
enterprises’ sector was measured by generic sectoral categories (services, industrial, and 
commercial) and using industrial as a reference group (Chowdhury et al. 2015). The tech-
nological profile was controlled using a binary variable that takes a value of 1 when the 
establishment was involved in technological sectors (Agarwal et al. 2010). Additionally, we 
controlled contextual characteristics including the State where the establishment is located 
(Meyer et al. 2009), and a dummy variable to control the level of distrust perceived by the 
establishment (Wu 2005).
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3.4  Data analysis
We used an ordinary-least-squares (OLS). OLS is a generalised modelling technique 
applied with multiple explanatory variables and also categorical explanatory variables 
that have been appropriately coded (Greene 2003). The general model estimated was: 
Y = α + β1X1 + β2X2 + ε; where, Y = enterprises’ social innovation;  X1 = formal institutional 
conditions; and  X2 = informal institutional conditions. By adopting this model, we tested 
the explanatory variables on three models: Model 1 where the dependent variable was the 
total number of social innovations; Model 2 where the dependent variable was the number 
of technological (Model 2a) and traditional social innovations (Model 2b); and Model 3 
where the dependent variable was the cost associated to those social innovations. The mod-
eration effect of victimised was testing using two subsamples (non-victimised establish-
ment and victimised establishment) in Model 1 and Model 3.
4  Findings and discussion
4.1  Descriptive statistics
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics. During 2012/14, on average, the establishments 
interviewed developed 1.53 innovations to address the social problems arising from the 
lack of quality of institutions in their regions. More than 28% of the establishments inter-
viewed recognised the existence of government programs, as well as identified some gov-
ernmental actions to reduce social problems. However, more than 56% of the establish-
ments perceived the corruption of police, ministerial, and public prosecutor. Moreover, 
almost 6% were extorted by public authorities and 2% by third persons. Thus, 4% of those 
establishments paid a fee or tribute to third persons. Regarding the structural characteris-
tics, 27% of these establishments have less than ten employees, 26% from 11 to 50 employ-
ees, 17% from 51 to 250 employees, and 30% more than 250 employees. In average, these 
establishments have operated in the Mexican market for approximately 17 years. Moreover, 
45% of the establishments developed an entrepreneurial activity associated with services 
(only 5% related to technological sectors).
Table 2 shows the correlation matrix that suggests low collinearity among the variables. 
The VIF was less than 2. It means that the standard error for the coefficient of that pre-
dictor variable is around two times as large as it. Therefore, the predictor variables were 
uncorrelated with the other predictor variables.
4.2  Formal conditions and the development of enterprises’ social innovations 
for protecting/preventing violent events
Table 3 presents the regressions estimated for Models 1–3.
Regarding formal factors, all models show that the existence of government programs 
oriented to attract inversions and sensitisation increased the number of enterprises’ social 
innovations to protect their entrepreneurial activities. Taking into account standard-
ised coefficients, the effect of sensitisation programs (0.067; p < 0.001) is slightly higher 
than the effect of attracting inversions (0.040; p < 0.001). If we analyse the nature of the 
implemented measures, the effect of government programmes is higher when enterprises 
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develop technological innovations as GPS or protection systems cyberattacks (0.068; 
p < 0.001 for sensitisation, 0.054; p < 0.001 for attraction of inversions) than traditional 
social innovations as change of locks/doors, build gates/fences or change the location. On 
the other hand, The effect of anti-crime programs is significant when our dependent vari-
able is associated with the cost of enterprises’ social innovations (Model 3). Reactive gov-
ernment intervention increases the cost of social innovations (0.057; p < 0.050). In other 
words, enterprises tend to invest more money in both technological/traditional measures 
to address the societal problems that limited the daily development of their activities and 
security. These results are aligned to previous empirical studies that found that the exist-
ence of reactive governmental programs increases vulnerabilities that criminal individuals/
organisations seek to exploit (Bunker 2013; Coleman et al. 2005; Edwards 2001). Under 
these conditions, individuals/organisations transforming their perspective and looking for 
the preventing/protecting solutions that the institutions do not provide (Mair and Marti 
2009; Marti et  al. 2013; Van Wijk et  al. 2015). However, not all enterprises have avail-
able resources/capabilities to implement this kind of initiatives. Less than 10% of the total 
sample have developed/implemented these initiatives. Although the survey’s year showed 
lower levels of homicides (Kan 2011), criminal behaviours will be not eradicated only with 
reactive governmental programs. Therefore, these results support our H1.
Concerning government actions to reduce societal problems, our standardised coeffi-
cients show that the maintenance of actions (− 0.031; p < 0.050), street lighting (− 0.047; 
p < 0.050), and the increment of patrols (− 0.062; p < 0.001) reduced the number of social 
innovations implemented by the Mexican enterprises (Model 1). Similar tendencies are 
observed in technological innovations (Model 2a) and investment in enterprises’ innova-
tions (Model 3). Mainly, the highest effect is produced by the existence of more patrols 
where the enterprises develop their economic activities. A plausible explanation is how 
the perception of real/tangible actions decreases the opportunity that creative people take 
advantage of the institutional weaknesses to generate unproductive or illegal activities. 
Even though the ambiguity of previous empirical studies, Levitt (2004) identify several 
practices adopted by governments that reduced societal problems such as crime and inse-
curity, specifically, authors conclude that more qualified police were associated with reduc-
tions in societal problems. Also, we did not find strong evidence on the effect of specific 
government actions such as the implementation of video surveillance and street operations 
to reduce insecurity problems. Our results are similar than the findings observed in U.S. 
cities by Corman and Mocan (2002) and Levitt (2004); where the implementation of tech-
nological initiatives produced few or null visible effects. In this sense, these results support 
our H2.
4.3  Informal conditions and the development of enterprises’ social innovations 
for protecting/preventing violent events
Concerning informal factors, Model 1 shows the effect of diverse modalities of corrup-
tion on the number of social innovations implemented by the Mexican establishments 
during 2012 and 2014. Excluding the corruption linked to the Army because we did not 
find strong evidence, the standardised coefficients of corruption associated to Ministerial 
(0.040; p < 0.050) and public prosecutor (0.038; p < 0.050), whom represents the soci-
ety judicially and ensure the respect of constitutional rights and guarantees, produced an 
increment in the number of enterprises’ actions to protect their entrepreneurial activities. 
Particularly, Ministerial corruption evidences a higher effect on technological measures 
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(0.037; p < 0.100) than traditional measures (0.034; p < 0.100), as well as on the cost 
associated to those measures (0.039; p < 0.100). In these scenarios, the evidence reveals 
that corruption is not beneficial for Mexican establishments (Méon and Sekkat 2005). By 
aligning extant empirical studies, corruption tends to be a barrier to entrepreneurial activ-
ity (Aidis 2005; Klapper et al. 2010). Following Rodriguez et al. (2005), our results may 
reveal a pervasive corruption in the interaction of enterprises with authorities but also with 
some shades of arbitrary from corrupt authorities to maximise their benefits. In this line, 
results support H3.
By contrasting our results, taking into account standardised coefficients, the num-
ber of total enterprises’ social innovations (0.088; p < 0.001), both technological (0.084; 
p < 0.001) and traditional (0.068; p < 0.001), as well as in the expenditure linked to those 
innovations (0.076; p < 0.001) increased notably by the influence of extortion from authori-
ties. Similar tendencies are observed in the case of extortions or tribute required by third 
persons. Results show that extortion is a major hindrance for any entrepreneurial activity 
because it is a channel for understanding resource misallocation (Mehlum et al. 2002; Mor-
selli and Giguere 2006; Ranasinghe 2012). On the one hand, establishments paid attention 
to the demand for payments from authorities or third persons (Morselli and Giguere 2006). 
On the other hand, establishments also need to find innovative mechanisms of protection 
(Mehlum et al. 2002). The sustainability of these mechanisms will depend on the opportu-
nity/cost and the allocation of resources (Ranasinghe 2012). Therefore, results support H4.
Our results also reveal the influence of informal trade on the number of social inno-
vations of Mexican establishments (0.039; p < 0.050) and in the cost of those initiatives 
(0.061; p < 0.001). In the case of this explanatory variable, the effect that it produces by 
type is slightly higher in non-technological social innovation (0.040; p < 0.050) than tech-
nological (0.038; p < 0.050). In this case, establishments faced informal competitors with 
more competitive advantages in terms of costs because their exploitation of opportunities 
occurs within informal institutional boundaries (Webb et al. 2009; Zimmerman and Zeitz 
2002). Usually, those informal boundaries are associated with regions with higher crime 
rates (Gould Ellen and O’Regan 2008). Therefore, formal enterprises are more oriented 
to ensure the development of their activities reinforcing alternatives to solve these social 
problematics. Therefore, our results support H5.
4.4  Moderation effect of victimisation
Table  4 shows the moderation effects of victimisation. Regarding formal environmental 
conditions, we observe on Model 1a and Model 3a that the effect of that governmental 
intervention (attraction of inversions and sensitisation) on the number of enterprises’ social 
innovations is highest when enterprises have been victimised (supporting H1a). Similarly, 
Model 1a and Model 3a reveal that the effect of reactive governmental actions (patrols 
and maintenance) on the number of social innovations is reinforced when those enterprises 
have been victimised (supporting H2a).
Concerning informal environmental conditions, we only obtained evidence about the 
effect of public prosecutor corruption. Therefore, if we compare the standardised coeffi-
cients in Model 1 (Table 3) and Model 1a (Table 4), we suggest that the effect of corrup-
tion on the number of social innovations will be reinforced when those enterprises have 
been victimised (supporting H3a). Excepting fee/tribute to third persons, the variables 
associated to extortion (e.g., from authorities and third persons) evidenced that their effect 
on the number of social innovations is reinforced when those enterprises have not been 
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victimised (Model 1b and Model 3b). Therefore, we did not find strong evidence to support 
our H4a. In this vein, the effect of informal trade on the number of social innovations is 
reinforced when those enterprises have not been victimised (Model 1b and Model 3b). In 
this sense, we did not find strong evidence to support our H5a.
5  Conclusions
The study analysed the influence of formal institutions (government programs and actions) 
and informal institutions (corruption, extortion and informal trade) on the development/
implementation of enterprises’ technological initiatives for protecting/preventing of vic-
timisation. By testing our model using data from the National Victimisation Survey from 
the INEGI, we can extract three relevant conclusions. First, formal institutional conditions 
such as programs are associated with an increment in the number were social innovations. 
However, more tangible actions as patrols reduced the number of measures implemented 
by enterprises to address societal problems. The main reason could be the minor effect pro-
duced when the lack of quality of institutions does not solve the societal problems (Vaccaro 
and Palazzo 2015; Williams and Godson 2002). Second, informal environmental condi-
tions have a substantial weight on the decision to implement social innovations. Neverthe-
less, we need to take into account that informal conditions (corruption, extortion and infor-
mal trade) are the mirror of formal conditions (government programs, laws, actions). It 
means that we are not able to disconnect both conditions because their transformations are 
closely related (North 1990). Third, victimisation reinforced the effect of certain informal/
formal conditions on social innovations. For victimised, the effect on the number of social 
innovations is reinforced in the case of formal conditions. However, the effects vary in the 
case of informal conditions.
Our study contributes to the literature by shedding some light on the linkages between 
technology transfer and social innovations developed by established enterprises for com-
prising certain formal/informal institutional conditions (Greenwood et al. 2011; Howard-
Grenville et al. 2014; Stenholm et al. 2013; Schweitzer et al. 2015), as well as participating 
in the debate on the roles of certain actors such enterprises and governments in developing 
economies (Griffin and Prakash 2014; Witkamp et al. 2011; Lee et al. 2015; Subramaniam 
et al. 2015). These insights are useful for the manager and policymakers to better address 
issues related to organisations and societies. For policymakers, this study exhibits key for-
mal/informal determinants of enterprises’ social innovations. If policymakers expect a tran-
sition towards a more advanced economy is still required a change, evolution, and transfor-
mation the quality of institutions (educational system, labour market, security, and stable 
regulation, among others). Given the structural characteristic of institutions, it requires an 
active work in formal conditions to impact on the configuration of informal conditions and 
vice versa. For enterprise managers, this study offers insights about the mechanisms and 
practices for social innovation practices.
This study has several limitations that provide excellent opportunities for future 
research. The first limitation is the database used to analyse this phenomenon. Given the 
INEGI’s confidentiality restrictions, we have access only to the data in its installations. In 
this sense, we did not have access to all variables, and their treatment/analysis was limited 
to the statistical resources available. Future studies could focus on reinforcing the statistical 
models by using other techniques and variables that allow analysing in-depth this phenom-
enon per regions (Agarwal et al. 2010). The second limitation is the lack of information 
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about organisational variables (e.g., indicators associated with productivity and perfor-
mance). We only have access to the cost associated with those social innovations. There-
fore, we did not explore other indirect/direct effects or externalities produced by formal/
informal environmental conditions (Okereke et  al. 2012). In this sense, another research 
venue could be explored corporate governance and responsibility issues behind those prac-
tices (De Bakker et al. 2005; Egri and Ralston 2008; Griffin and Prakash 2014) and organi-
sational transformations to face institutional complexity (Greenwood et al. 2011). The third 
limitation is the proxy used to explore social innovations. A natural extension of this work 
could include novel theoretical/methodological approaches to understand the linkages 
between technology transfer and social innovation in similar contexts. We hope that the 
directions proposed in this research will inspire many colleagues to extend the understand-
ing of: (a) the role of technology transfer in stimulating a new modality of social innova-
tions developed by established enterprises for protecting/preventing the effects of violent 
events or wicked problems, and (b) the outcomes of these practices.
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